While climate change has given nuclear power a new lease on life as a carbon neutral source of energy, it is the subject of almost unique public dread. This poses a significant, if geographically uneven, obstacle to any nuclear renaissance. The aim of this research is to understand the determinants of public perceptions of nuclear power and the potential for scientific risk communication interventions to change them in a 'post-truth' era of pervasive public distrust. This project will:
1. Explore the historical evolution of public risk perceptions around nuclear power and radiation.
2. Explain whether, how, and why those perceptions vary and change.
3. Develop and test communication interventions to shift public perceptions.
RATIONALE FOR STUDY:
After WWII humankind's relationship with radiation dramatically changed, with the debates around fallout and nuclear power becoming key political battlegrounds. The unique fear that radiation in the context of nuclear power elicits became the focus of intense academic work. Psychometric research highlighted three key factors to risk perceptions: understanding of risk, feelings of dread and the number of people exposed (Slovic et al, 1982). Nuclear power was one of the key empirical cases for risk research during the 70s and 80s. In a landmark study Fischoff et al. (1978) noted nuclear power's uniquely dreaded profile in comparison to any other risks. However, it was also found that radiation fears were far from unified, with radiation from nuclear power a source of major concern, whilst natural or medical sources were not. Despite decades of extensive research on nuclear power acceptability/public support, nuclear remains highly controversial.
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) is a suitable theoretical framework to use for the creation of risk communications strategies as it accounts for the complex socio-cultural, socio-political and historical framing that radiation and nuclear inevitably is subject to (Kasperson, 2012). Additionally, it also provides a framework for how to attenuate perceived risks, something that is central to this project. However, the decline and shift of public trust in regulators and industry towards interest groups has created a range of issues for risk communication (Lofstedt, 2005). This has severely impacted nuclear power, especially in relations to its secretive weapons background (Weart, 2012) and its 'manufactured' nature whereby it is marked by human agency, which can aid distrust (Beck, 1992). Indeed, Kasperson (2012) calls for work into the relationship between SARF and trust, as well as a close examination of the amplification process regarding nuclear power and radiation.
Furthermore, the concepts of post-truth and truth decay have gained interest recently as public discourse is increasingly polarised. Social media plays an important role in this, especially regarding the creation of 'info bubbles'. In turn, social media algorithms create the possibility for an interesting application of SARF and the amplification of certain viewpoints. These developments have also seen the role of 'objective facts' has become diminished with competing sets of 'facts' being deployed to support a certain viewpoint (Kavanagh & Rich, 2018). This is especially pertinent in nuclear discourse, where there are large discrepancies on e.g. casualties and health effects after nuclear accidents which, in turn, affect public perceptions significantly.
As Slovic (2012) notes, Fukushima highlighted that risk communication strategies for nuclear power are inadequate and the need for effective strategies to be designed prior to the next nuclear accident. This research will therefore be able to make significant academic contributions, not only in regards to risk communication around nuclear power and radiation, but wider contributions in regards to SARF and post truth/trust research.